**APPENDIX A:**
**A GENEALOGY OF ETHICS ON THE THRESHOLD OF HEIDEGGER'S**
**"THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY"**

Having explored some of the key terms driving Heidegger's ideas in chapter 1, we can now turn to its second focus—the longstanding ethical tradition resonating within his works. To repeat, it would be a mistake to confuse Heidegger's undercurrents with the formative ethical systems preceding him. What should be noted, however, are the threads of resemblance motivating an intersubjective responsibility, felt with particular potency at the conclusion of the "Question Concerning Technology." If we are to position Heidegger's plea for our salvation through the realm of art, examining past traditions will clarify the radical nature of his thinking while keeping intact some of the conditions making conduct ethical.

To begin, Aristotle offers two specific lines of thought: he sets a course for an ethics of living and lends his Four Causes to Heidegger's opening thoughts in the "Question Concerning Technology"—most notably the causa efficiens which Heidegger uses to deconstruct meaning and advance a new understanding of the gathering that takes place within the act of creation. Following Aristotle, Mill's Utilitarianism and Kant's Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals will be investigated in light of a brief consideration of ethics, noting the threads carried from the past and forward into Heidegger's own writings. Lévinas and Arendt have much to offer in terms of Heidegger's legacy, both direct and indirect. Lévinas protested that Heidegger ignored the other as a constituting force in the shaping of our selfhood, placing ethics as first philosophy. In addition, Lévinas offers a fervent critique of Heidegger, the man in action, and his involvement with National Socialism—a fact that we investigate briefly at the close of chapter 1. Arendt diverges slightly from Levinas' objections by manifesting an ethics of thinking and action, born within Heidegger's thoughts on non-objective or meditative thinking and the allowance for truths to unfold as events or alētheia.

In sum, the dialogue that exists between this shortlist of philosophers is rich and nuanced, shedding much needed light on Heidegger's ethical undertones. We will see in Heidegger's work, while not extrinsically anchored in normative ethical thinking, traces of these past traditions. Where Aristotle values contemplation as virtuous, Heidegger demonstrates the need for meditative thinking, or the dwelling in uncertainty that results from remaining open to truth as an ever-becoming event. Kant recognizes a drive toward Reason while Heidegger exposes dispositions that consider such motivations more holistically. Mill's position reveals an enlightened self-interest and Heidegger, once again, might view this as an expression of an inauthentic self-care as it disregards our fundamental dispositions. What is clear is the resonance manifesting throughout Heidegger's writing and reinforces the position that his plea is an ethical one.

And, yet, the question of an ethics is problematic in current times. The loss of any 'solid ground' or stable values in general makes such a proposition challenging. We fall into questions of intent, genealogy and slippage as we interrogate basic normative codes of conduct, wondering all the while if such regulations are legitimate in a world wherein meaning is constantly shifting. In what follows, I will examine ethical positions that connect, whether directly or indirectly, with Heidegger's undertones specific to the "Question Concerning Technology." What becomes apparent is a trans-historical conversation through

which many principles that have been deemed appropriate to justice and civil conduct endure, transforming quite subtly, as Heidegger would agree, over time with the ongoing flow of history. It remains true, however, that "structures of right and wrong [continue to] exist in all known cultures" (Brooks). Regardless of the negation ethics faces in postmodern cultural critiques, it can easily be argued that a society lacking such structures falls into rapid ruin. To illustrate this, David Brooks wrote these reflections in an Op-Ed for the New York Times in October of 2016:

> Moral capital is the set of shared habits, norms, institutions and values that make common life possible. Left to our own, we human beings have an impressive capacity for selfishness. Unadorned, the struggle for power has a tendency to become barbaric. So people in decent societies agree on a million informal restraints—codes of politeness, humility and mutual respect that girdle selfishness and steer us toward reconciliation. (Brooks)[1]

Brooks is addressing an apparent dissolution of ethical standards as was vividly illustrated in the 2016 United States presidential race. In order to clarify his thoughts, he continues with a return to justice as a guiding principle, as did Plato when writing the Republic: "[W]hat is just is balanced and in harmony with itself" (Plato quoted in Brooks). Brooks is returning to the Greeks, as often did Heidegger.

We know that justice is paramount in Plato's Republic although, to our 21st century minds, the means he suggests to achieve such harmony are often extraordinary. And, yet, the fundamental ideas remain. Plato quotes Socrates as saying:

> And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not concerned with someone's doing his own job on the outside. On the contrary, it is concerned with what is inside; with himself, really, and the things that are his own. It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his own, rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together, just as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave—lowest, highest, middle—as well as any others that may be in between. (Plato 443c 132)

In other words, it is by means of self-regulation and an aim at harmonious co-existence with the ruling forces that one maintains a just disposition among others. Plato maintains that it is by means of an innate sense of self-control that one maintains greater political balance. That said, the diagnosis of democracy as potentially corrupt as compared to its aristocratic counterparts seems to be playing out as our modern world devolves. Democracy's just society is failing to maintain the equalities and freedoms inherent in its original values. It may also be observed that our technological means of communication are exacerbating the disintegration of ideals by rapidly disseminating unsavory and flatly false commentaries. There seems to be no bottom to the depths we are falling. This is precisely the state of Being

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about which Heidegger warns us—the calamitous disintegration of our capacity for thought in relation to Gestell.

For Aristotle, a philosopher preferring the primacy of experience over dwelling in the purity of ideas, our ultimate virtue is to achieve happiness through eudaemonia, or, loosely translated, a flourishing spirit. This interpretation of joy differs from our understanding in today's parlance: our current measure might equate joy with gratification in matters of personal gain. Eudaemonia is a happiness born in a life of contemplation or in reasoned philosophical practice. This particular approach to an ultimately virtuous life forecasts Heidegger's understanding of meditative thinking and Arendt's ethics of thinking as a premise for basic societal order. Aristotle determined:

> For contemplation is both the highest form of activity (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects that it apprehends are the highest things that can be known), and also it is the most continuous, because we are more capable of continuous contemplation than we are of any practical activity. (Barnes 1177a, lines 20-5, NE 270)

Arendt would agree that our highest vocation is to think and to act from those reflections independently. Doing so is beneficial to a more tempered society.

Aristotle recognizes the multifaceted nature of such an enterprise, understanding that the world and its circumstances are in flux. He states,

> Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention and not by nature. (Barnes 1130)

Aristotle differentiates between convention (normative rules) and our own human nature (innate to us, the will) as able to determine a righteous path. Here, we can see one broad connection emerging between Heidegger and Aristotle: neither thinker situates ethics within transcendent Truths, choosing rather the structures and the indicative agency of human beings. For Aristotle, this manifests itself in seeking our Eudaimonia. For Heidegger, human beings express their virtue through the Care-structure. These notions run parallel in some ways while being subtly different.

Aristotle seems to preface the reconfiguration of the Essence issue that we later see in Heidegger's efforts (cf. Truth, Technology, Dasein). There are certain features that merit elaboration in relation to Heidegger's ethical undertones. The first of these is the articulation of virtue as an ongoing event spanning the entirety of life and demanding an inclination toward thought or contemplation. Virtue becomes a holistic project—rather than isolated moments—that result in a life of happiness. We must live this life fully and in accordance with our highest nature. In Aristotle's words, eudaemonia is "an activity of the soul in accordance to excellence" (NE 17, Barnes 1098a16) and is reflective of a fully productive life. The ultimate good that comes from our virtue, therefore, benefits society as a whole and will contribute to a meaningful and peaceful state. Reason is our guide and thinking is our calling.

In Heidegger's words, "the way is one of thinking." To which he adds, "we would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics" (Krell 311). This echoes Aristotle's virtuous life as a journey of contemplation.

Aristotle also insists that the obligatory negates good will and virtue, and in order to be authentic, virtue must be experienced as an intrinsic motivation that seeks to elevate the mind. He elaborates: "Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying is a mean relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it" (NE, ch. II, §6, 1107a, 1148). He distinguishes between happiness as derived from selfish pleasures and a more general concern for community as a whole. In addition, "some people have thought that the 'natural law' of human life is ferocious competitive struggle, with little room for altruism and justice" (Blackburn 85) To this, Aristotle counters, it is "finer and more godlike to bring about the well-being of a whole city than to sustain the happiness of just one person" (NE 1094b7–10). If we are indeed intended to be happy, and happiness is derived through virtue, then it follows that we must lead lives of virtue in order to be happy with both being a practice or process as opposed to simply a cause and effect formula.

This circular understanding of our worth demonstrates that a person of discipline, education and good intentions will inevitably be ethical. Yet there is also the notion that we live among others, which for Heidegger, affects much of our thinking and actions. Aristotle insisted, "[T]he wise man, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient" (Barnes §1177b1, 1860). We are reminded of the similarity between Aristotle's praise of friendship and Mitsein, as explored in Heidegger's use of language. We are always already amidst others, and while this is a critical feature of our being, it does not determine nor elicit our own contemplative life, to borrow Arendt's nomenclature.[2] It simply may drive us to better conduct or higher pursuits of intellectual understanding.

For Heidegger, our interconnectedness has darker potentials as well. The problematic modes of Theyness reflect the social pressures of Vice in Aristotle, wherein our internal harmony, needed to remain virtuous, is shifted. This imbalance forces a closing off through the influence of others, thus mirroring the impact of theyness as a prerequisite for Gestell. This externally imposed influence would signal, for Aristotle, a corruption of the mind, thereby constituting vice. Aristotle's notion of Friendship illustrates this point well. We must maintain ourselves in light of our relationships, holding the position that what we wish for others must be uniquely for their good. Per Aristotle, "Those who wish good things to their friends for the sake of the latter are friends most of all, because they do so because of their friends themselves, and not coincidentally" (NE 1156b9–11). It is worth noting, however, that while Aristotle is explicit about the Moral nature of these dispositions, Heidegger is simply accounting for the Structures of Dasein. The underlying case for Authenticity and Care implies a moral charge, thereby carrying traces of Aristotle's virtue forward in a radicalized way.[3]

Aristotle's ethical system has an enduring quality. Its rootedness in reason informs Immanuel Kant's 1785 revolution in ethical thinking as expressed in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In both this volume and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant sets forth the Categorical Imperative,[4] a normative ethics based in man's capacities for intrinsic reasoning and moral judgments. Ultimately, the potential for reasoned ethical functioning translates to the greater good of humanity. As moral beings, we act in the world in response to our duty as a reasoned end in itself and with consciousness fixed on its universal nature. Kant explains,

> But what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even without regard for the effect expected from it, in order for the will to be called good absolutely and without limitation? Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, that is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:402, 17)

Kant is operating on the assumption that we must live by our duty, creating in so doing a universal application of moral conduct in the face of a shared humanity. This communal existence underscores a 'shared capacity to love, and suffer, and hope, and fear, and remember' (Blackburn 124). We reach for a higher plane of conduct through our virtuous a priori disposition, namely our capacity for and drive toward reason.

The attainment of reason presupposes a cultivated desire to be 'good' and act in concert with the benefit of others while managing the ongoing internal struggle we have with the volatility of our desires. Good conduct demands we use Reason to direct our Will toward moral goals, for our personal sakes and those of others. For Kant, this discernment is a matter of Practical Reason, thereby echoing the Greek notion of 'praxis.' His undergirding principle mirrors the Golden Rule as found in numerous religious teachings, while endeavoring to escape some of their contradictions. He asserts, "Act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (4:21, 34). This oft-cited edict attempts to separate itself from religious undertones by deploying reason as its guiding principle. While religion relies on metaphysical bases, Kant, in contrast, enthusiastically offers the ability to summon ethical conduct from the Self, making it possible for anyone to act from duty without dependence on externally imposed ideas. As with Aristotle, the benefit to a virtuous life—or, in Kant's case, a dutiful and rational existence—is the general health of the greater population, predicated on justice and harmony, rather than purely on happiness. Kant writes, "So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (4:428, 41). The universal application of the Categorical Imperative intimates that what is good for one must necessarily be determined as good for all.

In order to understand the continued relevance of these ideas, we must return briefly to David Brooks. He states, "If somebody is destroying the basic social and moral fabric through brutalistic rhetoric and vicious misogynistic behavior, it doesn't really matter that he agrees with you on taxes and the Supreme Court; he has to be renounced or else he will

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2. vita contemplativa is something Arendt unpacks in her writings about thinking. This concept also corresponds to her notion of a vita activa, which underpins her ethics of action—something that will become increasingly important as this project unfolds.

3.  The premise that only the best men can become virtuous by means of a contemplative life is dangerous. It moves forward into a Nietzschean position that very few detach from the herd and achieve the status of über-mensch. In addition, "some people have thought that the 'natural law' of human life is ferocious competitive struggle, with little room for altruism and justice" (Being Good). He states, it is "finer and more godlike" to bring about the well-being of a whole city than to sustain the happiness of just one person (EN 1094b7–10). (Stanford Plato site) And Nietzsche is shifting the paradigm away from Morality, which his Genealogy shows to be a kind of evolving construct. That's a kind of blow to what Aristotle otherwise takes for Granted (that Virtue/Vice have some kind of definite basis), although both could be said to be doing an ethics of existence.

4.  Kant ultimately abandons the 'Happiness' grounding principle after seeing it pass into Bentham's pre-Mill Utilitarianism. Kant does not believe Happiness can be contrived as the basis for Ethics.

drag the whole society to a level of degradation that will make all decent politics impossible" (Brooks). Here is a well-suited illustration of the universalization of ethical conduct at work in contemporary world events. If we all comported ourselves in the manner of those currently striving for power, civility as we know it would cease to exist. This uncivil environment underscores Kant's understanding of the need for universally acceptable normative structures by which we must live.

Arendt has much to say regarding the free fall associated with the misuse of power and denial of will as a potentially corrupting force. In her explorations of totalitarianism and its connections with Heidegger's understanding of theyness, she offers the following insights:

> In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and nothing was true ... The totalitarian mass leaders based their propaganda on the correct psychological assumption that, under such conditions, one could make people believe the most fantastic statements one day, and trust that if the next day they were given irrefutable proof of their falsehood, they would take refuge in cynicism; instead of deserting the leaders who had lied to them, they would protest that they had known all along that the statement was a lie and would admire the leaders for their superior tactical cleverness. (OoT 499)

Arendt reveals the insidious ways our modes of thought are appropriated and corrupted. This corrupted mode of thinking will become evident as a concretization of Heidegger's ideas in Arendt's ethics of action in which just action is predicated on the ability to think or to apply all of our collaborative faculties in assessing what presents itself to us.

Of course, there is far more to Kant's investigation than I have room to address here. What remains important is the undercurrent that structures of conduct are needed in order for a well-functioning society to thrive. The defining features of the Categorical Imperative take into account civility and appropriate conduct in relation to others, suggesting, however subtly, an intersubjectivity that presupposes a need for order. Although conceived on terms that Heidegger will not fully endorse, Kant's longing for such a world is reflected in his notion of the kingdom of ends in which our desire for goodness and obedience lies in service of the greater good of humanity. Kant explains, "[E]very rational being must act as if he were by his maxims at all times a law-giving member of the universal kingdom of ends" (Kant 1997a, 45/4:438). Our humanity becomes the ends; the rational being, capable through self-mastery of moral conduct, is the vehicle by which we coexist in harmony. In such a way, each of us gives law to furthering humanity and establishing a righteous order. In addition, these structures are motivated not by some means but, instead, for the sake of duty and the good in themselves. Kant elaborates, "[M]ere conformity to law as such, without having as its basis some law determined for certain actions, is what serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept" (Feinberg 593). Kant begins with subjectivity and then moves outwards to intersubjectivity, as an extension of the self's obligation to moral duty rather than a dependent preexisting disposition as Heidegger would imply.

Another more calculated ethical formulation is set forth by John Stuart Mill whose volume Utilitarianism establishes the credo: "the greatest happiness for the greatest number."

He bases ethical value on reason, mathematics and perhaps a kind of enlightened self-interest since Mill roots his ideas in the pleasure-pain principle. Though he builds upon an Aristotelian premise of happiness as the greater goal of living, he deviates in his interpretation of what this means with regards to an ethical system. Mill states,

> The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness ... that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. (7)

Our responsibility to the 'happiness principle' holds us accountable to the greater good of our fellow human. Clearly, the notion that depriving another of happiness counts as an immoral act directly speaks to an intersubjective responsibility. Mill states "that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned" (17). This notion of harmony recalls Plato's understanding of a just society needing to be in sync with its basic element—the citizen.

Mill further makes the case that utilitarian systems invoke the golden rule, albeit indirectly, and labels it the "complete spirit of the ethics of utility" (17) with its principle of the greatest happiness being synonymous with avoidance of pain. In this idea, we find the thread that binds together Plato's injunction to educate children in such a way as to make them virtuous, Aristotle's advancement of a virtuous, happy life and Kant's Categorical Imperative bound in a "social arrangement [that places] the happiness or (as, speaking practically, it may be called) the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole" (Mill 17). Although this premise does carry the vestiges of a Kingdom of Ends, Kant considers Happiness a weak premise of ethical conduct. Mill also argues that "an act that fails to maximize happiness is called wrong only if 'we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it — if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience'" (xi). The greatest number principle is based in feelings of 'pleasure,' particularly as avoidance of pain rather than a paradigm of Duty as with Kant. In addition, Mill's self-society relation maintains a certain 'distance' within its formulation as to how we approach moral ideas and practices. Mill explains,

> Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always declared that the useful means these, among other things. (Mill 6)

In his quest to concretize utilitarianism, Mill overlooks what is fundamental to both Aristotle and (later) Heidegger—the journey toward wholeness or virtue is an ongoing process. It generates a revealing or disclosure of truth as temporal and in motion. The formulaic nature of utilitarianism deprives it of this possibility, thus falling short by limiting thinking and making ethical decisions somewhat clinical.

The very premise of the greatest happiness theory deploys an objectifying perspective that loses track of the process view of subjectivity and norms found in both Aristotle and Heidegger. It could even be posited that Mill's happiness theory contributes to Heidegger's understanding of enframing in its alienation and extrinsic motivations. While this may be the case, it bears noting the ways ethical philosophies structured the need for moral conduct prior to a phenomenological hermeneutic approach. Heidegger's phenomenology of being-in-the-world transfers virtue to a necessity for authenticity and care while maintaining their process-based practice. It is within this ever-becoming ethics that "The Question Concerning Technology" places humanity's saving grace.

Mill's inclination toward the greatest happiness principle generates an intention that puts into crisis the means of its achievement. Perhaps, to this end, Karl Marx's investigation of the relationship between labor and capital, with the explicit directive to liberate the proletariat from his self-alienation, deserves mention, particularly in relation to Heidegger's use of Marx's term standing reserve (see QCT 321-322). There is a clear relationship between Marx's alienation and Gestell specifically expressed within theyness and the essence of technology. The direct appropriation of the term standing reserve suggests that technology carries traces of capitalism in its alienation of man from himself through labor. No longer is man in direct contact with his disposition toward 'making'—a consequence of the industrial revolution and assembly line manufacturing. Human beings abandon their natural inclinations and participate in organized schemas, belonging as a result to the societal systems that come to dominate existence. In making this connection, the relationship between capitalism and technology exhibit the same corruptive forces. de Beistegui elaborates on this point:

> Man has become his own slave, a working animal that must carry on working in order to produce, and to produce in order to consume. His will, this very will that constitutes his pride and that he erects as an instrument of his domination over the whole of the earth, is nothing but the expression of what Heidegger calls the 'will to will.' Yet this man does not realize that his labor and his will spin in a vacuum, moving him ever more forcefully away from his essence. (104)

Again, the sense of alienation—a severe distancing from our life structures—comes to the fore. Technology acts in such a way as to render human beings to the ends in themselves, negating our humanity in this objectifying move. Heidegger's explicit warning of the imprisoning characteristics of Gestell and theyness appear in the appropriation of human dispositions in the greater technological apparatus. Dasein is taken hostage, and authentic, poetic dwelling retreats to the shadows of existence.

Marx's understanding of alienation touches upon Kant's concern for the corrupting force of using others as a means to an end. It begs us to wonder how the reductive nature of technology has been simultaneously perpetuated and ignored? In addition, it asks how an ethics of thinking, per Heidegger and Arendt, might embolden the potential for freedom? This barring of thought and prohibition of authentic dwelling underpins much of Hannah Arendt's ideas; her numerous texts on the subject echo Heidegger's concerns. In the essay Collective Responsibility, Arendt demonstrates her concern for issues shaping moral conduct:

> If we strip moral imperatives of their religious connotations and origins, we are left with the Socratic proposition 'It is better to suffer wrong than

to do wrong,' and its strange substantiation, 'For it is better for me to be at odds with the whole world than, being one, to be at odds with myself.' However we may interpret this invocation of the axiom of noncontradiction in moral matters, as though the one and the same imperative, 'Thou shalt not contradict yourself,' is axiomatic for logic and ethics (which incidentally is still Kant's chief argument for the categorical imperative), one thing seems clear: the presupposition is that I live together not only with others but also with my self, and that this togetherness, as it were, has precedence over all others. (RJ 153)

Arendt's contention is that we cannot help but be members of a community, and perhaps this, above all else, shapes our conduct. Arendt formed her career in an attempt to understand the conditions needed for ultimate corruption to manifest in both the political sphere and in the life of the mind. Her work clearly demonstrates the ways theyness and enframing influence larger political movements and bring out, in so doing, the potential for extreme corruption. While she is best known for diagnosing the banality of evil in relation to Adolf Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, what will concern us principally is Arendt's careful consideration of thinking and action as ethical practices in themselves. In addition, Arendt's understanding of freedom as that into which we are born will reflect Heidegger's assertion that we must exercise a responsibility toward choice as we actively seek an authentic disposition toward living. Arendt's requisite ethics carry traces of Aristotle's practice of contemplative virtue in context of the greater communal good, Kant's sense of active reason and the Kingdom of Ends and Heidegger's departure from essential normative ethical structures. Her ethics is a process of reflective consideration of our world and its events.[5]

Arendt is speaking in practical terms about the conditions that make evil manifest. She states, "[I]n the center of moral considerations of human conduct stands the self; in the center of political considerations of conduct stands the world" (RJ 153). For Arendt, we can only achieve an ethical way of being by means of continued practice, similar to Heidegger's view of alētheia as an ongoing revelation. Our singularity remains the expression of our best possible self in order that we live a virtuous life—in line with Aristotle's eudaemonia as a consequence of a contemplative disposition. Our ethical conduct emerges from a place of self-regulation. Arendt explains,

> If he is a thinking being, rooted in his thoughts and remembrances, and hence knowing that he has to live with himself, there will be limits to what he can permit himself to do, and these limits will not be imposed on him from the outside, but will be self-set. These limits can change considerably and uncomfortably from person to person, from country to country, from century to century; but limitless, extreme evil is possible only where these self-grown roots, which automatically limit the possibilities, are entirely absent. (RJ 101)

Arendt acknowledges the subtle movement of societal norms but underscores the personal responsibility we each possess with regards to our choices and behaviors. If our virtue lies in our singularity, we own the responsibility for ethical action. She tempers Kant's version of practical reason by asserting that the rational plays a role in thinking in collaboration

5. If one includes Nietzsche in the above list of influences, then one sees how Arendt goes into the existential plane (immanence) like him but without erasing Morality. In a sense, she one-ups Nietzsche.

with our will, as the two are correspondingly intertwined. To Arendt, "[Kant's view] was insufficiently political, because the dutiful agents take no responsibility for the consequences of his acts, because Kant's notion of duty, as Eichmann showed, can be perverted, and because (although of course Kant knew nothing of this) the limitlessness of thoughtless evil eludes its conceptual grasp" (RJ xxii). As this statement implies, we are too easily co-opted by external forces such as Heidegger's theyness and forgotteness in relation to being-in-the-world. This interdependency reflects Heidegger's assertion that we are indivisible beings with dispositions and moods that direct our behavior.

Arendt further concretizes Heidegger's ontological concern by recognizing the role we play toward ourselves in every interaction. Arendt continues, "Solitude means that though alone, I am together with somebody (myself, that is)" (98). Her assertion reflects Aristotle's understanding of friendship as a mirror of self-love. In Responsibility and Judgment, she quotes Cato who says, "Never am I more active than when I do nothing, never am I less alone than when I am by myself" (99). Thought becomes a preamble to action and, akin with Heidegger's ideas on poēisis, contemplation underpins the manner of the poets. The banality of evil exists in the vacuous absence of thought and morphs into an extreme and corrupted species of theyness when left unchecked. This represents a missed function of Mitsein and collectivity.

Arendt's ideas, as discussed above, are critical to this project, particularly as reflections of Heidegger's ethical undertones. As both his student and subsequent defender, Arendt expresses in real terms the consequences of ignoring the suppression of self-reflection and thought, resulting in a complete negation of Aristotelian contemplation. She illustrates such a path in the following description:

> In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and nothing was true.... The totalitarian mass leaders based their propaganda on the correct psychological assumption that, under such conditions, one could make people believe the most fantastic statements one day, and trust that if the next day they were given irrefutable proof of their falsehood, they would take refuge in cynicism; instead of deserting the leaders who had lied to them, they would protest that they had known all along that the statement was a lie and would admire the leaders for their superior tactical cleverness. (OoT 499)

This scenario (which has repeated itself throughout recent history with unfortunate frequency) highlights what might result from an abandonment of thought to external, corrupt forces. It is the ultimate expression of Heidegger's Gestell, demonstrating the mental imprisonment hobbling the masses.

Also noteworthy is Arendt's belief in our freedom as an a priori ontological disposition, opened to us at birth. In other words, we arrive with a tendency toward action and are able to choose our paths accordingly. She states, "[T]he new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting" (HC 9). This freedom echoes Heidegger's understanding of the potential forming the basis of Gelassenheit and the active 'letting be' also inherent in this characteristic. It is through the work Arendt accomplishes that we begin to see

manifestations of Heidegger's philosophy of thinking. He lays the foundation on which Arendt carefully builds her ideas, taking his ideas farther than he was able to do himself. She continues, "The fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible only because each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world" (HC 177–8). The potential for action, unexpected and unique, is part of the solution proposed in Heidegger's plea and exercises this birthright. To reiterate his words, "The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds" (Krell 313). According to Arendt, the responsibility human beings have toward a response is therefore always already present from the start of life and the potential for the unexpected is constant. This implies that our obligation toward participation and action are within us, yet possibly dormant, as might be the case under the conditions of theyness. Arendt touches upon Kantian duty (more so than Heidegger was willing to do) to uphold what is morally correct while acknowledging external effects influencing decisions each individual must make.

With Arendt's ideas, we see the presentation of personal responsibility and culpability in relation to our singular choices—something ultimately existential in nature as we have the ethical burden of self-direction. We are the bearer of guilt when we face ourselves in such culpability. This notion suggests an ultimate responsibility for the greater good of our community through appropriate actions and builds on Kant's assertion that we are collectively co-creators of our humanity. While not implicating the other directly, Arendt does suggest the need to protect the greater good of the world through conscious choice and deliberate action. As we have noted above, Arendt refers to this as our collective responsibility.

Despite this collective responsibility, it bears asking to what extent our self-direction is determined by intersubjective exchange? To this query, Emmanuel Lévinas proposes ethics as originary of philosophy, rather than as a distinct and separate branch of study, with our responsibility and interconnectedness binding us inextricably to the Other. Although Lévinas was among Heidegger's most vociferous critics, he nonetheless carried forward traces of Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics. His ideas do not fall strictly into a traditional ethics, however, and are expressed in terms of relationships. We see this in our encounter with the Face, with the recognition that I must, in a sense, account for my existence through the gaze that confronts me. He says, "Here the concern for justice is born, which is the basis for the theoretical. But it is always starting out from the Face, from the responsibility for the other that justice appears, which calls for judgment and comparison, a comparison of what is in principle incomparable, for every being is unique; every other is unique" (EN 104). Arendt's singularity is manifested indirectly in these thoughts, although with a move toward our collective disposition. Lévinas continues, "One of the most important things for me is that asymmetry and that formula: All men are responsible for one another and I more than anyone else" (107). In other words, in beholding the Other, I am most accountable for his existence, regardless of his actions or disposition. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, it is within this exchange that the Self is grounded.

Pushing beyond Kant's formulation of Humanity and Mill's greater happiness theory, Lévinas ultimately radicalizes Mitsein as the shaper of our being. He asks, "Is that the word of God? A word that requires me as the one responsible for the Other; and there is an election there, because that responsibility is inalienable" (108). The return to responsibility connects with Heidegger's Care and Arendt's notion of our singularity, but maintains the bonds that drive our ethical conduct. From this premise, Lévinas argued that Heidegger's thinking did not consider the Other in any significant way, despite his exploration of Mitsein and theyness, and the correlative dispositions that affect our interactions with the world. Furthermore, Lévinas observes that it was Bergson, not Heidegger, whose thoughts introduced temporality and shifted philosophical focus to human creative intuition, or the élan vital (Kearney Dialogues 65). Thus, for Lévinas, the life process of care, in its essentially temporal disposition, emerges either directly or indirectly from Bergson. As Lévinas moved toward phenomenology as a method, he explains, "The phenomenological method permits consciousness to understand its own preoccupations, to reflect upon itself and thus discover all the hidden or neglected horizons of its intentionality" (Kearney Dialogues 65). (These particular points are increasingly important in the analysis of the artists' works in chapters 3-5.)

As we have seen through this brief exploration of ethical traditions, enframing has been a consistent worry either in its expression through theyness or the manner in which it manipulates being into falling prey to greater societal forces imposing structures of thought. Freedom, contemplation and living the fullest potential of our humanity connect ethical premises, and prescriptive solutions seek to protect what is our highest manifestation. These normative structures or decrees have varied throughout the ages, but an enduring concern for essential freedom remains. Heidegger's efforts intended to break free of such norms. As we have noted throughout, Heidegger's shift beyond the normative addresses the more foundational need for authenticity and care, dispositions we must incorporate into our individual lives. He reassigns new meaning to old premises, exploring the ways Dasein, through its structures and dispositions, leads us to freedom. In the introduction to Responsibility and Judgment, Kohn explains, "For Arendt the contingency of human freedom is the real crisis in which we live today; it cannot be avoided, and the only meaningful question that can be asked is whether or not our freedom pleases us, whether or not we are willing to pay its price" (RJ xxvi). Arendt is walking a fine line balancing our existential reality on the one hand with the necessity for collective responsibility on the other. Herewith, we move into our singular position, all the while maintaining the necessity of moral conduct. This returns us to Heidegger's opening paragraph in the "Question Concerning Technology," in which he implicates our contemplative nature on the quest to ensure our ultimate freedom within the event of truth. The suggestion that we might return to our essence by means of thinking has prophetic undertones given the current global relationship human beings have with technology and the widespread disappearance of contemplation as a source of virtue and liberation.

Through our exploration of themes and a small number of key thinkers in the ethical tradition, we are now in a much better position to understand Heidegger's ethics as an ontological practice and disposition—something that may not be directly evident as

we read his texts. Although only briefly, I have highlighted some systems that resonate within his notion of Mitsein, care or solicitude as ongoing practices and structures of our being. In addition, we have looked at Heidegger's continued concern for the salvation of Dasein through the authentic expression of our potential. Although traces of each of the aforementioned thinkers manifest in Heidegger's writing thereby coloring his ideas, it is his departure from normative ethics toward a phenomenological hermeneutics that is most significant.

### APPENDIX B:  BENJAMIN + HEIDEGGER ON LANGUAGE AS THE ORIGIN OF MEANING

For Benjamin, language serves both as a style of reasoning and careful attention to words and as a conduit for understanding human experience. In her introduction to Illuminations, Arendt quotes Benjamin's words penned in a letter to Hugo Hofmannsthal in 1924,

> The conviction which guides me in my literary attempts ... [is] that each truth has its home, its ancestral palace, in language, that this palace was built with the oldest logoi, and that to a truth thus founded the insights of the sciences will remain inferior for as long as they make do here and there in the area of language like nomads, as it were, in the conviction of the sign character of language which produces the irresponsible arbitrariness of their terminology. (IL 47)

Arendt draws a parallel between the thoughts expressed herein and Heidegger's later writings — demonstrating the lasting impact of Benjamin's ideas and the foretelling of Heidegger's objection to science as a dominant purveyor of truth. In addition, traces of Heidegger's 'language as the house of Being' such as he presents in his Letter on Humanism can be detected in his letter. Thinking is at home within language as it finds its expression therein. Heidegger states:

> Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking Being comes to language. Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring the manifestation of Being to language and maintain it in language through their speech. Thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks. Such action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the highest, because it concerns the relation of Being to man (Krell 217).

His view of Freedom is similar; it is an abstraction that we are unable to 'hold,' a presencing that comes before us. By the same token, to live within language can both liberate and limit expression while manifesting in every facet of existence. If indeed language is the home of truth (we might say where truth dwells) above the capabilities of the sciences, and if we are to avoid the 'irresponsible arbitrariness' of its usage, then a careful examination of the terminology deployed in Benjamin's essay, as well as those expressed in related texts, seems paramount. Such an examination allows us to acknowledge Benjamin's reasoning and careful

attention to Marxist language while also keeping track of the dangers language faces when falling into fixed structures — in essence, becoming enframed. At the very least, unpacking Benjamin's terminology will enable us to set a proper course for a clear understanding of what follows, all the while underscoring the trans-historical nature of the foundational ideas.

## APPENDIX C: GENEALOGY OF SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY: THE AMBIGUITY OF TRUTH / NON-TRUTH IN THE WORK OF MIRZA + BUTLER

We turn our attention first to the issues informing the subject matter of the artwork, undertaking a genealogical investigation of the ideas and historical events shaping its content. To assist with this effort, we will examine the historical narrative with the support of colonial and post-colonial thinkers Said, Spivak and Bhabha, while recognizing the internalization of colonialism by many who live in its aftermath. In addition, Foucault's discourse and Arendt's plurality will serve to both question and clarify the enduring difficulties expressed in South Asia's tumultuous story. The profound connections between past and present will become vividly clear as we undertake our reading of Mirza and Butler's video essay in section 4 of chapter 5.

In support of this genealogical approach, Foucault writes, "History . . . is certainly the most erudite, the most aware, the most conscious, and possibly the most cluttered area of our memory; but it is equally the depths from which all beings emerge into their precarious, glittering existence" (OoT 219). History, particularly the violent oppression of a nation by external forces, quite literally collapses within each frame of Mirza and Butler's artwork, demonstrating the continuum of a past that, regardless of decades of emotional separation, is directing contemporary geo-political actions. There are several overarching questions that inform our investigation: How does history actively manifest in present-day events? How does an understanding of the past benefit our understanding of ongoing acts of violence? Certainly, one must investigate Foucault's épistèmes as units of an historical a priori anchoring broader knowledge and understanding. Without such an investigation, one risks not fully experiencing the emancipatory potential of The Unreliable Narrator.

At the center of Mirza and Butler's film is an understanding of colonialism and the post-colonial nationalist tensions between Pakistan and India born of centuries of British rule. Furthermore, the artwork alludes to the viciously animated hostilities and subsequent discourse brought into being by the arbitrary 1947 territorial partitioning of the Indian subcontinent. The partition, as delineated by the departing British Raj, along with the elected Hindu and Muslim leadership, recklessly accelerated the effort to define national boundaries based on the separation of Muslims and Hindus. The division emphasized cultural difference over political collaboration. The rushed imposition of externally drawn lines of demarcation created a wave of destruction that actively simmers in collective post-memory (or the latent spaces feeding current beliefs) decades later.

The voiceover script underpinning the film speaks of "a Dadaist nightmare framed as a moral response to the tortured, humiliated and photographed bodies of the slim men and women elsewhere—it is a drama of violent death, a monstrous form of revenge of Bollywood

proportions" (The Unreliable Narrator). As testimony to this fact, at the time of this writing, both nations are celebrating 70 years since they gained their respective 'freedom' from British rule—and only now are those who survived the subsequent genocidal carnage articulating their trauma in various collections of oral and written histories.[6] These stories, recounted on the pages of various publications, illustrate the lingering pain and trauma inflicted upon the South Asian people so many decades ago.

Also consequential are the strategic considerations imposed upon the subcontinent by larger nation states, including the US's cold war with the former USSR, China vying for both military and economic benefits, and the former USSR pressing down through Afghanistan. In his book Deadly Embrace, author Bruce Riedel places a large share of responsibility for the turmoil affecting Pakistan on the United States, whose focus on the region shifted in the aftermath of the defeat and withdrawal of the "Soviet Fortieth Red Army in Afghanistan, which was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war" (3). With regards to this dynamic, Riedel continues "[the U.S.] then focused its attention elsewhere (ironically, much of it on Iraq), leaving Afghanistan to become transformed, not into a stable and friendly nation, but a hostile and fanatic foe eager to host al Qaeda and as the base for the deadliest attack ever on U.S. soil" (3). The short-term interference of foreign powers continues. In the November 10, 2017 issue of The Week, several editorial writers speak of recent U.S. overtures favoring India, explicitly denouncing Pakistan and further exacerbating festering tensions. Depending on their various interests in India, the outside nations' motivations and actions vary, but the result is the same: a subcontinent in unending geopolitical turmoil, which provides fodder for the expansion of jihad and ongoing acts of aggression.

Where did all of this conflict originate? With the dawn of the seventeenth century, the British were initially enticed to South Asia by its potential for economic expansion and global trade. Their actions paved the way for what is now called globalization. What the British encountered, according to the New History of India, was an ensemble of largely Muslim Mughal emperors, who ruled with relative tolerance and ethnic respect, adapting their own cultural practices to existing local Hindu norms, thereby facilitating a pluralistic society. The British joined the stage during a period of relative peace. Queen Elizabeth I signed the East India Royal Charter in the year 1600 granting its ambitious stakeholders the right to establish trade in the region to their great economic advantage (Baladouni).[7] While the East India Company's intention was material gain rather than territorial acquisition, the weakening Mughal Empire offered an opening for further strategic control; the Brits' increased jurisdiction was largely taken by force and coercion (Dalrymple).[8] Some regional leaders bowed to the expanding British presence, willingly cooperating with demands, while other regional leaders fought aggressively to maintain their dominion. The Mughal Emperor Nuruddin Salim Jahangir (r. 1605-1627), in a gesture of cooperation, wrote a letter responding to the 1612 invitation from James I to sign a reciprocal trade treaty giving the

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6. A number of articles appeared in 2017 on this topic, in response to the anniversary celebrations and lingering malaise the partition created. The New York Times and Washington Post published articles focused on the memories that linger and have recently been mined by the surviving populations on both sides of the line.
7. Baladouni, Vahe (Fall 1983). "Accounting in the Early Years of the East India Company." The Accounting Historians Journal. The Academy of Accounting Historians. 10 (2): 63–80. JSTOR 40697780 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/40697780).
8. Dalrymple, William (4 March 2015). "The East India Company: The original corporate raiders" (https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/04/east-india-company-original-corporate-raiders). The Guardian. Retrieved 2017-09-17.

East India Company exclusivity and property rights in exchange for European goods and "rarities."[9] Other local rulers were not so welcoming. By the end of the seventeenth century, with trade open to other British interests, the field of competitors for the available economic opportunities grew along with the stakes involved in such commercial ventures.[10]

The British struggled all the while with other external commercial forces competing for trade advantages. In these early stages of commerce, other nation states were finding trade routes lucrative. Piracy abounded as ships began their voyages laden with materials headed for Europe with subsequent violent conflicts fought on Indian soil and waters. The Dutch, Danes, Portuguese and French were among these other nationalities fighting for a stake in the wealth generated through South Asia's trading routes and natural resources. Despite these monetary interests, while establishing deeper alliances with British, the Portuguese ceded their control over Goa, Bombay and Chittagong in 1662 as "part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza" (Tyacke 39).[11] Though there were multiple challenges to its advancing control, the East India Company, using growing military strength and pervasive force, eventually monopolized the Indian Subcontinent, profiting from its total occupation while systematically repressing local cultures and mores.

This measure of control was achieved by means of private armies, deployed by the East India Company and its directors. In Dalrymple's words, "It was not the British government that seized India at the end of the 18th century, but a dangerously unregulated private company headquartered in one small office, five windows wide, in London, and managed in India by an unstable sociopath—[Robert] Clive."[12] The ruthless profiteering initiated in the early seventeenth century set up structures of dominance and established longstanding hierarchies of power administered by foreigners who cared little about South Asia's rich cultural heritage. Nor were the British interested in perpetuating the pluralistic social norms hitherto enjoyed by the Indian people.

These activities and proclivities to force a submission of the other, the native as it were, mirror Foucault's understanding of dominance and control, as laid out in Discipline and Punish. In addition, the imbalance of power toward the colonialist forces nurtured an undercurrent of resistance as described by Caygill. Indeed, the progressive overtaking of India's territories planted the seeds for later resistance, seeds that would lay dormant for many decades. Edward Said explains,

> The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony ... The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be 'Oriental' in all those

ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it could be—that is, submitted to being—made Oriental. There is very little consent to be found. (Harrison and Wood 1007-1008).

Said understands the nature of colonization and domination, and the resignation of vast populations under such structures. Under British rule, cultural characteristics were sublimated and replaced, thus creating an alienation of heritage, along with a pervasive mood of shame for one's own identity and alleged inferiority. The suppression (manifesting in the replacement of the dominant language, the introduction and imposition of new religious mores, the wholesale replacement of educational systems, shifting the measure of a successful society, etc.) created a tide of resentment and resistance. In Mirza and Butler's work, this chasm exists in the space between the Eton exam and brutal realities unfolding in Mumbai, a space of cultural dissonance and inequity surfacing today.

In the "Order of Discourse," Foucault asserts, "Any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses [that is, the transference of discourse(s) from one person/social group to another], along with knowledges and powers which they carry" (222). These ideas echo Heidegger's understanding of Being as historical, embedded within Heritage and life among others. By imposing British educational systems and enforcing the belief in its superiority, millions of South Asian children were raised into this ideological position. Said elaborates, "[W]hat we must respect and try to grasp is the sheer knitted-together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable durability" (Harrison and Wood 1008). Over centuries, South Asia's consciousness shifted; it simultaneously bowed to the prevailing discourse and sowed seeds of resistance.

The profound marginalization created insurrections, among them the Rebellion of 1857. "In 1857, Indians rose in revolt against the high-handed and oppressive [East India] Company rule—particularly its insensitivity toward their religions—and it took excessively brutal action by the Company's army to regain control of its possessions" (Parliament. uk). The violence and atrocity evidenced in this conflict prompted the British Crown to intervene, ultimately passing the Government of India Act of 1858; the Crown assumed control, making Victoria Queen and Empress of India. This act did not ameliorate levels of oppression nor end the stronghold over India's populace. Quite the contrary, the remaining economic ties held the firmly imposed structures wholly in place, with British interests well ahead of India's. Mirza and Butler's artwork carries the traces of this historical reality, one in which visitors to South Asia retain the privileges and wealth denied to the vast majority of its native-born citizenry. The disparity is evidenced as the young jihadist recruits express awe over luxuries and opulence they have never before witnessed, riches so startling as to shift their attention from their mission to destroy it. Their role reveals the historical divide and reinforces the inequities created through centuries of colonization and oppression.

We will see clearly how the acceleration of technologies and events made possible with the industrial revolution magnified the challenges faced by India's people, regardless of faith or economic status. The 20th century brought with it increased global violence, and as discussed in prior chapters, unspeakable atrocities and genocide. The British Raj, and its subjects,

fought in both World Wars, with substantial losses of life and economic prosperity. World War II, though ostensibly 'won' by the Allied forces, left Britain in economic ruin. The long narrative of imperialism that had come to define British identity began to falter.

During the decades between World Wars, several key figures grew into Indian political power, emerging from British educations as attorneys, practicing law to the extent the British Raj permitted. Three key figures—Mahātmā Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Pandit Jawaharial Nehru and Mohammed Ali Jinnah—orchestrated an Indian independence movement. They formed the Hindu Congress and Muslim League, gathering enormous momentum in support of their respective campaigns. Their efforts and the upheaval that ensued were not welcome by the British Raj; they were imprisoned and, physically abused. Gandhi's personal experience with racial inequity in South Africa galvanized his principled approach of non-violent resistance, living his ideals through his actions and an outright rejection of his own position within the Hindu caste system, choosing instead to live among the 'untouchable caste,' Hinduism's lowest rung in society.

At the risk of grossly oversimplifying a long and arduous historical trajectory, what emerged from British imperialist rule was a focus on difference; disparate religions and identity politics existed within Western structures. Arendt warns against such strategies of oppression, as they negate the distinctive characteristics of unique beings, thus setting up a foundation of discord. Notions of superiority (already built into the Hindu caste system) were exacerbated by long-standing oppression. Alex von Tunzelmann explains, in her volume Indian Summer, when "the British started to define 'communities' based on religious identity and attach political representation to them, many Indians stopped accepting the diversity of their own thoughts and began to ask themselves in which of the boxes they belonged" (Dalrymple "Great Divide").

The categorization of human beings reflected the well-trodden discourse of racial superiority that satisfied the imperialist need to hold onto power. This discourse is also reminiscent of Kristeva's understanding of the Abject as an 'othered' impurity, used to constitute a social system of identity and structure. Such efforts reinforce Foucault's notion of discourse's exclusion of the other as a means of control. Foucault states,

> But when we view things on a different scale, when we ask the question of what this will to truth has been and constantly is, across other discourses, this will to truth which has crossed so many centuries of our history; what is, in its very general form, the type of division which governs our will to know (notre volonté de savoir), then what we see taking shape is perhaps something like a system of exclusion, a historical, modifiable, and institutionally constraining system. (Young 54)

Jinnah capitalized on the mounting tensions, pressing for an independent Muslim state, so as to avoid further marginalization and oppression by the larger Hindu governance. Eventually, through extensive deliberation and complex political negotiations, Britain was ready to relinquish control of her 'crown jewel' to its rightful people, the 400 plus million Indians preparing for freedom, whatever that freedom might represent. While both the British and the Hindu Congress were vehemently opposed to any division of the sub-continent, Jinnah

and other members of the Muslim League believed it to be the only acceptable direction, if their voices were ever to have any consequence.

Amid increasing levels of inter-sectarian violence, the ultimate decision to divide India and a newly founded Pakistan fell to Louis Mountbatten, the last Vice Roy to oversee the British Raj. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the chairman of the Border Commission who held little prior demographic understanding of the region, drew the divisions. Pakistan's projected lands would be separated by a stretch of Indian soil, thereby creating East and West wings of a nation whose largely Muslim populations had little else in common other than their fundamental religious beliefs. The Mountbatten Plan, crafted from conversations with individual political leaders and an urgently felt presentiment that India would imminently dissolve into civil war, yielded Pakistan to Jinnah, while endeavoring to keep its landholdings as small as possible so as to satisfy the Hindu Congress. Furthermore, Mountbatten advised the 'princely states' to accede to their choice of either Pakistan or India.

When warned by Abul Kalam Azad of potential outbursts of violence, Mountbatten responded,

> At least on this question I shall give you complete assurance. I shall see to it that there is no bloodshed and riot. I am a soldier and not a civilian. Once partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue orders to see that there are no communal disturbances anywhere in the country. If there should be the slightest agitation, I shall adopt the sternest measures to nip the trouble in the bud. (Jagmohan 49)

The illusion of control as stated in these comments expresses the Orientalist power position—without recognizing the social strife underway. The British simply assumed that through their sovereignty and domination they would maintain civility throughout the period of transition. Caygill carefully notes the outcomes from any such displacements of power when unmet with an equilibrium of polity. When explaining Arendt's position with regards to the suppression of disparate populations, he explains, "Total domination seeks to reduce human diversity to a biopolitical essence, an animal species, except that Arendt went even further in saying that this 'animal life' is itself further reduced to a 'thing' that can be shaped and controlled" (Resistance 154). What becomes clear, through a genealogy of India's past, is such external control has disastrous consequences.

Indeed, Mountbatten's assurances were met with an unfathomable wave of brutality, reaching such depths of depravity that Margaret Bourke White, on photographic assignment for Life Magazine at the time, described the ensuing events as on par with those she witnessed at Buchenwald only two years prior. An estimated one to two million civilians perished in the weeks after India and Pakistan won their independence from British rule, leaving indelible scars on both sides of the newly established border. William Dalrymple writes for the New Yorker, "Across the Indian subcontinent, communities that had coexisted for almost a millennium attacked each other in a terrifying outbreak of sectarian violence, with Hindus and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other—a mutual genocide as unexpected as it was unprecedented" (Dalrymple 2015).

Ayesha Jalal states "the Partition is the central historical event in twentieth century South Asia. . . . A defining moment that is neither beginning nor end, partition continues to influence how the peoples and states of postcolonial South Asia envisage their past, present and future" (qtd. in Dalrymple). Indeed, accounts of the atrocities continue to haunt current generations through a pervasive infusion of post-memory and discourse. The radical displacement of entire communities coupled with extreme animosity emanating from the highest levels of leadership set course for an unstable future. This outcome was well anticipated by Gandhi who understood that even the smallest measures of violence would escalate (Caygill Resistance 76). Dalrymple concludes, "Today, both India and Pakistan remain crippled by the narratives built around memories of the crimes of Partition, as politicians (particularly in India) and the military (particularly in Pakistan) continue to stoke the hatreds of 1947 for their own ends" (Dalrymple "Great Divide").

How does the sum of violence and strife manifest in current South Asian socio-political dynamics and discourse? We have noted centuries of foreign oppression and a constant undercurrent of corrupt commercial enterprise with vast segments of India's population placed in service of capitalist interests. It is not surprising, given these conditions, that resistance and force should marry in an effort to subvert political discourse and self-interest. Yasmin Khan, author of The Great Partition, judges that Partition "stands testament to the follies of empire, which ruptures community evolution, distorts historical trajectories and forces violent state formation from societies that would otherwise have taken different—and unknowable—paths" (Dalrymple "Great Divide").

The power vacuum created when the British Raj vacated its authority left an entire population at odds with itself. While the nature of South Asian (read Orientalist) discourse was indeed shifting, there continued to be embedded traditions of thought creating ever deeper divides. Spivak tells us, "Any extended discussion of remaking history in decolonization must take into account the dangerous fragility and tenacity of those concept metaphors" (Harrison and Wood 1095). Those concepts refer to nationalism, secularism, internationalism and culturalism (Harrison and Wood 1095). The improbable freedom achieved by both the Hindu Congress and Muslim League proved to be tenuous. Arguably, the two nations have yet to experience the unhindered independence they fought so hard to gain. With regards to this post-colonial condition and its implicit fragility, Homi Bhabha explains,

> It is in the emergence of the interstices—the overlap and displacement of domains of difference—that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated. How are subjects formed 'in-between,' or in excess of, the sum of the 'parts' of difference (usually intoned as race/class/gender, etc.)? How do strategies of representation or empowerment come to be formulated in the competing claims of communities where, despite shared histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of values, meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and dialogical, but may be profoundly antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable? (Bhabha, Harrison and Wood 1111)

It is the absence of dialogical collaboration—though this common value had existed for centuries—that drove South Asia into chaos. Without a mutual vision of what freedom and independence might look like to the whole (despite its pluralistic nature), the vacuum filled with bottomless rage, and perhaps the fear of further future repression. Whatever the cause of the mass killings and mutual genocide, decolonization left Pakistan and India in a perpetual state of war.

The idea that freedom is a liberating force is deceptive. Mirza and Butler's video essay makes our understanding of these currents indispensable to our apprehending of their message. Within each of the film's choreographed frames, we encounter a repetition of this brutal past complete in all its graphic details and urgency. To this notion, Spivak writes,

> For the moment let us hold onto the fact that the de-colonization does quite seriously represent a rupture for the colonized. It is counterintuitive to point at its repetitive negotiations. But it is precisely these counterintuitive imaginings that must be grasped when history is said to be remade, and a rupture is too easily declared because of the intuition of freedom that a merely political independence brings for a certain class. Such graspings will allow us to perceive that neocolonialism is a displaced repetition of many of the old lines laid down by colonialism. (Harrison and Wood 1094).

Spivak notes the repetition of well-entrenched systems of control and ongoing violence to the other. Thus, the power grabs originating in India's independence movement led to self-interested manipulation. Jinnah's immovable desire for an independent Muslim state, while initially moderate and secular in intent, continues to nurture ongoing acts of violence.

Neither India nor Pakistan will relinquish desired ownership of Kashmir. The first war over the disputed territories broke out in October 1947, just weeks after independence. In 1949, The United Nations imposed a cease-fire and a fragile (and brief) state of order marked the northernmost region of India. Over the past seven decades, a number of other conflicts have arisen, usually provoked by the ongoing dispute over Kashmir. These conflicts have included the 1965 War, the 1971 War, the 1989 Kashmir Insurgency, the 1999 Kargil Conflict and the active proliferation of nuclear weapons on both sides of the border. Following the devastation of 9/11, 2001 found the region, once again, on the brink of war, with Pakistan attempting to ease tensions by cooperating with the United States with regards to the capture of Osama bin Laden. All the while, global strategic interests continue to invite the attention of other nation states, whose respective stakes in the region include natural resources, strategic military operations and the sale and provision of arms.

In his narrative history titled Midnight's Furies, Nisid Hajari concludes the conflict is "getting more, rather than less, dangerous: the two countries' nuclear arsenals are growing, militant groups are becoming more capable, and rabid media outlets on both sides are shrinking the scope for moderate voices. . . . It is well past time that the heirs to Nehru and Jinnah finally put 1947's furies to rest" (Hajari 261). Hajari introduces the media's complicity in advancing prevailing beliefs, foretelling Baudrillard's assertion of its ultimate complicity with human action. Needless to say, the unrelenting production of discourse continues to limit human consciousness to a single story, precluding cooperation and possible relief from violence.

As though speaking through Arendt's understanding of plurality and equality, Spivak addresses the difficulties of moving past political manipulations of discourse:

> Briefly, it seems possible to say that an alternative and perhaps equally fragile mode of resistance to them can only come through a strategic acceptance of the centrifugal potential of the plurality and heterogeneity native to the subcontinent. Yet, heterogeneity is an elusive and ambivalent resource (except in metropolitan 'parliamentary' or academic space) as the recent past in India, and indeed on the globe, have shown. Its direct manipulation for electoral or diplomatic results constitutes devastation. (Harrison and Wood 1095)

Arendt speaks to the "paradoxical plurality of unique beings" (HC 176) as the fundamental premise underpinning the "basic condition of both action and speech" (HC 175). In much the same way that Arendt encourages the acceptance of plurality and political difference as expressed in cooperation, Spivak concisely summarizes the South Asian conflict, acknowledging the political jockeying and manipulations, which have resulted in widespread, ongoing devastation. Mirza and Butler underscore both Arendt's and Spivak's thoughts, expressed in the numerous references to geopolitical complexities manifesting in constant fear and violent outbreaks. To this point of view, Dalrymple adds, "1947 has yet to come to an end" ("Great Divide").